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An important component of conspiracy theories is how they influence, and are influenced
by, the evaluation of potential evidence. Some individuals may be more open minded
regarding certain explanations for events whereas others may seek closure and thus cut
off a conspiracy explanation. Two studies examined the relationship between the need
for cognitive closure (NFCC), levels of belief in real world conspiracy theories, and the
attribution of conspiracy theories to explain events. A first, small (N = 30) and preliminary
study found no relationship between NFCC and beliefs in conspiracy theories, suggesting
that both advocates and opponents of conspiracy explanations do not differ on this
dimension. A second study (N = 86) revealed that evidence for and against conspiracy
theories had an influence on attributions of the likelihood of a conspiracy to explain a novel
event. Specifically, after reading evidence individuals with high levels of belief in conspiracy
theories tended to rate a conspiracy explanation as more likely whereas those with low
levels of belief rated it as less likely. However, when the need for cognitive closure (NFCC)
was experimentally lowered the effects of prior beliefs in conspiracy theories diminished.
Keywords: bias, cognitive closure, conspiracy theory, evidence, knowledge
Conspiracy theorists often argue that official accounts of events
“close off” the possibility of alternative explanations by misin-
terpreting or ignoring evidence (e.g., Posner, 1993; Pipes, 1997;
Pastore, 2004). In contrast, those who argue against conspiracy
theory accounts frequently suggest that such accounts do not bear
up to rigorous scrutiny from a scientific or rational perspective
(Clarke, 2002). In the present research we explore, for the first
time, the relationship between beliefs in conspiracy theories and
the need for cognitive closure (NFCC, Webster and Kruglanski,
1994). We also investigate a related question of how evidence
affects the attribution of the likelihood that a conspiracy theory
explains a novel event.
The factors that underpin beliefs in conspiracy theories—
broadly defined as a set of beliefs that are used to explain
how a group of individuals is covertly seeking to influence
or cause certain events—constitute fertile ground for psy-
chological study. Not only are beliefs in conspiracy theories
widespread and on the increase (e.g., Goertzel, 1994; Swami
et al., 2011), they are also prone to a third person effect whereby
we feel others believe in conspiracy theories more than we
do (Douglas and Sutton, 2008). Conspiracy beliefs also have
profound importance in a society where conspiracy accounts
are implicated in erroneous interpretations of important events
(Leman and Cinnirella, 2007), may be associated with mis-
trust of political and social institutions (Kramer, 1999), and
affect behavior such as the decision whether to pursue health
care (Bird and Bogart, 2003; Tickner et al., 2010) or cooper-
ate with the criminal justice system (Parsons et al., 1999). It
is somewhat surprising then, that with some notable excep-
tions (e.g., Graumann and Moscovici, 1987; Swami et al.,
2011), comparatively few studies have sought to examine factors
and processes that are associated with beliefs in conspiracy
theories.
Social psychologists often argue that beliefs in conspiracy the-
ories are connected with broader social and intergroup conflicts
where conspiracy theories are used to justify and maintain con-
flict or to attribute blame to an unjust social system (Crocker
et al., 1999). Other research has sought to explain the appeal of
conspiracy theories by focusing on personality characteristics of
conspiracy theorists. Among other factors, a sense of powerless-
ness and anomie—an inability to affect change and feelings of
insignificance within society—have been found to correlate posi-
tively with high levels of beliefs in conspiracy theories (Hamsher
et al., 1968; Whitson and Galinsky, 2008; Bruder et al., 2013).
In terms of other aspects of personality, the picture appears
more complex. McHoskey (1995) found a negative relationship
between authoritarian attitudes and endorsements of conspir-
acy theories (arguing that individuals with authoritarian atti-
tudes are more likely to perceive Government as legitimate
and morally inscrutable). Individuals with a high score on the
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Altemeyer, 1988) were more
dismissive of possible conspiratorial explanations However, in
contrast (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), found a positive rela-
tionship between right-wing authoritarianism and conspiracy
beliefs. Political orientation and beliefs may influence conspiracy
beliefs in different ways in different contexts. In this vein, Swami
(2012) found a positive relationship between right wing author-
itarianism and beliefs in anti-Jewish conspiracy theories, but a
negative relationship with general beliefs in conspiracy theories.
Individuals may well pick and choose theories that fit with a par-
ticular political view or belief system (e.g., Leman, 2007; Wood
et al., 2012).
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Beliefs in conspiracy theories also have much to do with
the ways in which individuals interpret and contest the legit-
imacy of evidence (e.g., Harrison and Thomas, 1997; Leman,
2007). For instance, heuristics such as the linking of a major
event with a major cause may account for the attribution of
conspiracy theories to explain major public events (Leman and
Cinnirella, 2007). Individuals may be reluctant to consider or
assimilate disconfirming evidence once conspiratorial beliefs have
become established (confirmation bias, e.g., Klayman and Ha,
1987). However, the same resistance to novel or contradictory
evidence can be observed across different domains of reasoning,
and the same psychological processes of resistance to contra-
dictory information could just as likely apply to anti-theorists
too. It is also evident that disconfirming evidence can be inter-
preted in different ways. While high quality empirical evidence
will generally resolve disagreement (Lord et al., 1979), ambigu-
ous or questionable evidence is prone to an interpretation based
on confirmation heuristics (see again Klayman and Ha, 1987)
and a desire to avoid dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Moreover, evi-
dence that is deemed to confirm an individual’s existing beliefs
will tend to be unquestioned and accepted whereas disconfirm-
ing evidence will often be critically evaluated and rejected (see
again Lord et al., 1979). This serves to reduce cognitive dis-
sonance between attitude and evidence. As a result the same
information can often be appropriated to support both sides of
an argument.
Other variables such as NFCC may influence the motiva-
tional heuristics responsible for interpreting evidence. Previously,
researchers have identified relationship between tolerance of
ambiguity and beliefs in conspiracy theories (Abalakina-Paap
et al., 1999). However, NFCC is a subtly different concept in that is
identifies a drive for a certain view involving preference for order
and structure, as well as discomfort with ambiguity, and closed
mindedness (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). It involves two basic
tendencies. Firstly it involves a desire to obtain a quick solu-
tion or closure: this is referred to as seizing. Secondly it involves
a tendency to preserve this solution, thus maintaining closure:
referred to as friezing. Research has found that NFCC is both
dispositional and situational and therefore open to manipula-
tion. Time constraints (De Grada et al., 1999) and cognitive load
(Ford and Kruglanski, 1995) can increase levels of need. Inversely,
heightened accountability reduces the level of need (Ford and
Kruglanski, 1995). This reduction relies on the fact that when
making important decisions, the tendency to seize on a quick
answer will be negated.
A high level of NFCC produces a reliance on confirmation
heuristics (De Dreu et al., 1999) that results in a strengthen-
ing of existing beliefs. Low level NFCC induces systematic pro-
cessing (Klein and Webster, 2002) resulting in greater scrutiny
of information and evidence. Thus, levels of NFCC determine
how information may be processed, understood, and accepted
when interpreting evidence. For instance, Kruglanski et al. (1993)
found that participants under high NFCC conditions are less
persuadable than those low in NFCC. NFCC identifies a uni-
versal psychological process and in this respect should extend to
how conspiracy theorists and non-theorists process evidence and
develop beliefs.
The present research comprised two studies. Taken together
these studies explored, for the first time, the ways in which NFCC
relates to levels of belief in conspiracy theories and the attri-
bution of a conspiracy theory to explain novel events. The first
study sought to explore the correlation between various person-
ality characteristics, including NFCC, and beliefs in conspiracy
theories. Our key aim in the first study was to clarify the rela-
tionship between NFCC and belief in conspiracy theories. We
predicted, given that NFCC denotes a general psychological pro-
cess, that there is would be no association between NFCC and
levels of belief in conspiracies. Our second study examined the
relationship between NFCC, beliefs in conspiracy theories and
interpretation of evidence. This second study built upon the first
by focusing on how different factors may affect judgments about
a novel, ambiguous event. Specifically, a core question is how
NFCC, beliefs in conspiracy theories, and different types of evi-
dence affect judgments of the likelihood that the event was the
result of a conspiracy theory.
STUDY 1
A key motivation for our first study was to explore the relation-
ship between NFCC and levels of belief in conspiracy theories.
This was a small scale preliminary study to establish whether cor-
relations exist between several key variables and NFCC. Webster
and Kruglanski (1994) argue that NFCC is both dispositional
and situational. Individuals with a high NFCC tend to be more
entrenched in their attitudes and seek to reach a decision or
make a judgment more quickly and with less scrutiny than those
with low NFCC. In this first study, NFCC we treated as disposi-
tional and expected no relationship between NFCC and levels of
belief in conspiracy theories. In other words, we hypothesized that
both conspiracy theorists and non-theorists (anti-theorists) can
employ rigid, dogmatic, and a “closed approach” in evaluating
evidence.
We also examined relationships between authoritarianism,
interpersonal trust and alienation, as well as the attribution of the
likelihood of a conspiracy theory to explain events surrounding
a fictitious scenario involving the death of a President in a plane
crash. This last item was used to assess how far individuals were
inclined to attribute a conspiracy theory to account for a novel
situation.
Based on the previously reported work of (e.g., McHoskey,
1995; Swami, 2012), there is a somewhat complex relation
between authoritarianism and beliefs in conspiracy theories. We
therefore tentatively predicted that there would be a negative
relationship between levels of authoritarianism and beliefs in
conspiracy theories and the attribution score. Similarly, previous
research has suggested that levels of interpersonal trust are neg-
atively related to beliefs in conspiracy theories (Goertzel, 1994).
Hence it was predicted that there would be a negative relation-
ship between levels of interpersonal trust and beliefs in conspiracy
theories. However, no correlation was predicted between levels of
interpersonal trust and the attribution score.
Finally, an alienation scale (Ray, 1982) was also employed. This
reflected an attempt to broaden research in the area. The scale
measured factors relating to both powerlessness and anomie, but
in line with general feelings of alienation. It was predicted that
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there would be a positive relationship between alienation scores
and scores on the conspiracy and attribution scales, in line with
findings reported above on previous work exploring anomie and
powerlessness (Hamsher et al., 1968; Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-
Paap et al., 1999).
Based on previous research we predicted that gender would
not affect NFCC or scores for either the conspiracy or attribution
measure. Whist these variations are clearly important in consid-
ering the broader phenomenon of beliefs in conspiracy theories,
the scope of the present study required a clear focus on specific
aspects of the psychological processes underpinning such beliefs.
Hence the empirical focus was on a particular age group and
broadly homogeneous white, middle class student sample.
METHOD
Design
A correlational design examined the relation between beliefs in
real world conspiracy theories and the likelihood of attributing
events in a fictitious (or novel) scenario to a conspiracy. Other
measures included in the analysis were: feelings of alienation,
authoritarian-rebellion attitudes, levels of close interpersonal
trust and NFCC.
Participants
Thirty participants (15 males, 15 females, mean age 22 years)
were undergraduates attending a university in London, United
Kingdom. All participants were volunteers. All but one of the par-
ticipants described their ethnicity as white British (the other was
a British subject of Indian origin). No exclusion variables were
employed.
Materials and procedure
Participants were given an information sheet that included a
list of generic questions and 6 attitude scales. The first scale
was an 8-item Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories scale (BICT,
Appendix 1). The second scale was a 20-item Alienation scale
(Ray, 1982). The third scale was an adapted version of Kohn’s
(1972) Authoritarian- Rebellion scale (however, items 9, 12, 16,
and 20 were altered to exclude questions relating exclusively to
Canadian participants). The fourth scale was (Rempel et al.’s,
1985) 17-item Close Interpersonal Trust scale. The fifth scale was
a 46-item NFCC scale (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). The final
measure was the attribution of the likelihood of a conspiracy
theory in response to a fictitious vignette (see below).
The rating scales for all attitude measures (excluding the final
attribution measure) were adjusted to a uniform 5-point Likert
scale that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
On the attribution of likelihood scale a rating of 1 indicated
a belief that a conspiracy theory was highly likely, whereas 5
indicated it was highly unlikely. The attribution of conspiracy
measure asked participants to read a fictitious vignette report-
ing the death of a President of an unnamed nation in a plane
crash (see Appendix 2). After reading the vignette, participants
were asked to place a cross on a 5 cm line (ranging from left to
right, 0 cm = very likely to 5 cm = very unlikely) responding to
the statement; “How likely is it that there was a conspiracy behind
the plane crash?”
Participants were given a booklet of the scales to complete in
a pencil and paper test in a room on their own on campus. The
questionnaire took around 20min to complete.
Tests used only pre-existing measures that had good relia-
bility. However, in order to ascertain the robustness of these
measures for the present sample reliability tests were carried out
on the present data. Initially all scales were shown to be reliable
(alpha > 0.70), excluding the Authoritarianism-Rebellion scale.
Following the removal of low scoring items from all scales the
Authoritarianism-Rebellion scale achieved an acceptable reliabil-
ity (alpha = 0.64), and the reliability of the other scales also
improved. The final scale as a whole was also shown to be reliable
(N = 30, items = 99, alpha = 0.86). Further reliability analy-
sis was conducted on the NFCC scale by calculating the internal
lie scale score. All items were found to be within the margin for
inclusion (see again Webster and Kruglanski, 1994).
RESULTS
Pearson’s correlations were conducted on the 30 participants’
scores on the six attitude measures and results are shown in
Table 1. We also conducted a correlation analysis between gen-
eral BICT and the attribution of a conspiracy to explain a novel
event. This correlation was not significant (Pearson, N = 30, r =
−0.001, p = 0.997).
DISCUSSION
Contrary to expectations and some previous research (e.g.,
Swami, 2012) we found no relation between authoritarianism
and either beliefs in conspiracy or the tendency to invoke a
conspiracy theory to explain an unfamiliar event. However, as
predicted, there was a negative correlation between close interper-
sonal trust and beliefs in “real world” (i.e., not the hypothetical,
novel event) conspiracy theories. As others have found before
(e.g., Goertzel, 1994) individuals with low levels of interpersonal
trust tend to have higher levels of belief in conspiracy theories,
probably because they are less inclined to believe common, stan-
dard or widely held accounts. However, there was no correlation
between levels of interpersonal trust and the attribution of a con-
spiracy theory to explain the unfamiliar event. Thus, individuals
Table 1 | The correlation between scores on the alienation,
authoritarian-rebellion, close interpersonal trust and NFCC scales, in
relation to scores on the BICT and the attribution of conspiracy
theory to explain a fictitious event.
BICT (Real world
conspiracy theories)
Attribution of
conspiracy to explain a
novel event
Alienation 0.65** −0.40*
Close
interpersonal
trust
−0.38* 0.04
Authoritarian-
rebellion
0.28 0.10
NFCC −0.05 −0.05
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.001.
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with low levels of trust may be less trusting of “official” accounts
relating to real events, but low trust does not predispose people
to attribute a conspiracy theory to a new event. This is an impor-
tant finding because it suggests that whether or not we attribute a
conspiracy theory to explain an event is initially unaffected by lev-
els of interpersonal trust, but that over time trust may be a factor
in whether or not beliefs in a conspiracy endure. In this respect
the initial attribution of a conspiracy to explain an event may
be a consequence of simple heuristic processes associating cer-
tain events with certain types of cause (see Leman and Cinnirella,
2007). However, as evidence is presented those with low levels of
interpersonal trust may be more inclined to maintain beliefs in a
conspiracy, whereas others allow those beliefs to diminish in light
of subsequent evidence.
Both BICT and the attribution of conspiracy to a novel event
correlated significantly with alienation scores. Alienation was also
identified as a correlate of BICT. Alienation and the associated
constructs of powerlessness and anomie have consistently been
associated with BICT (Crocker et al., 1999). This suggests that
BICT may stem, at least in part, from feelings of dislocation from
society and social institutions. Alienation and anomie may also
account for the interesting finding that BICT are higher in ethnic
minority individuals (Crocker et al., 1999; Parsons et al., 1999;
Bird and Bogart, 2003) because these are groups who, tradition-
ally, have not been involved in government and other business,
political and social institutions, and hence feel disconnected from
authoritative decision-making processes.
Contrary to previous research (e.g., Swami et al., 2011) that
has found an association between beliefs in different conspira-
cies, our present study found no correlation between beliefs in
real world conspiracies and the likelihood of attributing a con-
spiracy to explain a novel event. This may be a consequence
of the exploratory nature of the present study and low sam-
ple size. It may be a consequence of national differences (UK
vs. the Austrian sample used in Swami et al.’s study 2 (2011),
which included a fictitious example of a conspiracy theory involv-
ing the Austrian “inventor” of the drink Red Bull). Additionally,
attributing a conspiracy to explain a fictitious event (constructing
a conspiracy account) is a rather different matter, psychologi-
cally, from believing in a conspiracy account that others have
already presented or that relates to an existing or actual event.
Different types of event or theory may inspire or provoke dif-
ferent sorts of belief. Thus, an alternative explanation is that
the decontextualized hypothetical (fictitious) scenario presented
to participants here is a different type of stimulus compared
with real world conspiracy beliefs. Thus, many conspiracy the-
ories may stem from the same sense of disengagement with
social institutions and authorities, or correspond to a particu-
lar set of political beliefs. And the correspondence between real
world beliefs may be a consequence of their sharing a com-
mon “stem,” whereas our hypothetical scenario did not readily
lend itself to any particular background story, context, or set of
existing socio-political beliefs. Future research can help to estab-
lish what common features of conspiracy theories underpin such
attributions.
The present findings point to the importance of individual and
social factors in mediating levels of belief in conspiracy theory.
However, the main motivation for the first study was to establish
if there was any relationship between NFCC and BICT. As pre-
dicted, there was no such relationship. In other words, high levels
of belief in conspiracy theory are not associated with participants’
NFCC. However, although we predicted no relation between
NFCC and conspiracy beliefs, other research has suggested that
related or overlapping concepts may and may not be associated
with such beliefs. For instance, Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) found
no association between individuals’ tolerance of ambiguity and
beliefs in conspiracies. On the other hand, Swami and Coles
(2010); Swami et al. (2011); Swami (2012) found a positive rela-
tion between the big five trait of openness and BICT. Openness
would appear to be negatively related to NFCC. However, it
may be possible that openness characterizes an open-minded
approach to unconventional views rather than to all views. As
such, those who are less likely to accept official accounts (the sta-
tus quo) may tend toward conspiracy theories. Thus, NFCC picks
out a different feature of cognitive style that is independent of a
societal consensus or socio-conventional thinking.
STUDY 2
The first study found no relationship between NFCC and BICT,
or the attribution of likelihood of a conspiracy theory to explain
a novel or fictitious scenario. However, findings from the first
study indicate that trust may be a factor in terms of whether
conspiracy beliefs endure or diminish over time, perhaps as peo-
ple come to scrutinize evidence. NFCC also influences the ways
in which evidence is evaluated or scrutinized. Specifically, sev-
eral studies have found that a high NFCC leads to less scrutiny
of evidence and a desire to reach a decision quickly, whereas
a low NFCC leads to more scrutiny (Ford and Kruglanski,
1995; De Dreu et al., 1999; Klein and Webster, 2002). In our
second study we sought to establish how, if at all, NFCC
relates to the ways in which evidence is evaluated in respect of
BICT.
In the second study, a new group of participants was asked
to read the same vignette describing the death of a President in
a plane crash that was used in study 1 (see again Appendix 2).
Again, participants were asked to attribute the likelihood that
the death was the result of a conspiracy. However, after this
participants were asked to read additional evidence that either
supported a conspiracy explanation for events, or did not sup-
port this account. In addition to different forms of evidence,
NFCC was also experimentally manipulated to be lower for some
participants. After reading this evidence, and under different
NFCC conditions, participants again completed the attribution
measure. Study one suggested that BICT may diminish over
time or in light of scrutiny of subsequent evidence. Therefore,
in this second study, participants completed the attribution
measure once again, 2 h later. Participants’ levels of belief in
real world conspiracy theories were again measured using the
BICT.
Following Ford and Kruglanski (1995) NFCC was manipu-
lated by varying the level of accountability to which participants
were subjected. This manipulation produced two groups of par-
ticipants. In the first, no specific additional instructions were
given. However, in the second (the high accountability group),
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participants were informed that they might be required to give an
explanation of their decision to a large group of eighty peers. In
this second group NFCC is lowered because the need for greater
accountability leads individuals to scrutinize their judgments and
beliefs more closely. In this case participants would be inclined
to think more carefully about (or scrutinize more systematically)
their decision to attribute the likelihood of a conspiracy the-
ory to explain a fictitious event. Whilst the association between
accountability and NFCC was not tested in this study, previ-
ous research has shown that accountability manipulations such
as this consistently lower NFCC (see again Ford and Kruglanski,
1995).
In light of findings from study one, it was predicted that there
would be no difference between groups when making the initial
attribution before manipulating differences in NFCC. However,
a main effect of evidence type (pro- or anti-conspiracy) was
expected: it was predicted that those reading evidence supporting
a conspiracy theory would rate a conspiracy theory explanation
as more likely after reading the evidence, whereas those reading
evidence against a conspiracy theory would rate the conspiracy as
less likely after reading this evidence.
An interaction was predicted between evidence condition
(pro- and anti-conspiracy) and NFCC (normal and low) groups
when attributing the likelihood of a conspiracy after differences
in accountability had been introduced. Specifically, it was antici-
pated that NFCC would magnify the influence of evidence type:
when NFCCwas lowered (high accountability) those reading pro-
conspiracy evidence would be even more likely to attribute a
conspiracy than those for whom there was no change in NFCC,
and similarly for those reading anti-conspiracy evidence. This
prediction relates to the theory that lowered NFCC, produced
in this instance from increased accountability, allows for system-
atic processing of information (Klein and Webster, 2002). This
in turn promotes assimilation of evidence and encourages atti-
tude change, and also relates to research showing that NFCC levels
mediate the extent to which evidence is re-interpreted (De Dreu
et al., 1999).
METHOD
Design
A mixed experimental design was employed. There were three
independent variables. The first, a between groups (pseudo-
independent) variable, was BICT and was measured using the
BICT (see Study 1). For the purposes of analysis participants were
divided into two groups around the midpoint of the scale (20
out of 40 maximum score) with high and low levels of belief.
This division into high and low scores distinguished participants
based upon features of the scale itself and constituted a sensible
approach to distinguishing groups around the scale’s midpoint.
The second independent variable was level of NFCC. This was
either normal or low and was again a between groups vari-
able determined through random allocation of participants to
either high or low accountability conditions. A third independent
variable was a between groups variable and was the evidence con-
dition: either pro-conspiracy or anti-conspiracy theory evidence.
The dependent variables were repeated measures of the attri-
bution of the likelihood of a conspiracy theory at three different
time points: first before reading evidence, second after reading the
evidence, and third 2 h after reading the evidence.
Participants
Eighty-six participants were involved in the study. Participants
were students at a university in South East England, United
Kingdom and were recruited on a voluntary basis during a class
that they were all attending. There were 79 women and 7 men,
average age 21 years. In terms of ethnicity, 15 described their eth-
nicity as South Asian (Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani), 1 as Black
(African-Caribbean) and 70 as white (European).
Materials and procedure
Participants were given a questionnaire pack that included an
information sheet, a consent form, the vignettes, several attri-
bution scales and finally the BICT. Altogether there were four
different versions of the questionnaire distributed at random
to participants in the class. In all versions, after the introduc-
tory questions and consent, participants read the vignette and
rated the likelihood of a conspiracy theory to explain events.
The following sections differed depending on the accountabil-
ity (NFCC; high or low) and evidence (pro- or anti-conspiracy)
condition. In one, participants were given instructions inducing
high accountability and then read pro-conspiracy evidence and,
in another, high accountability instructions and anti-evidence. In
another, they were given no instructions about accountability and
pro-conspiracy evidence and in another, no instructions about
accountability and anti-conspiracy evidence. Evidence statements
(pro- and anti-conspiracy) are given in Appendix 3.
Accountability was manipulated by including in the instruc-
tions written in the questionnaire booklet that five individuals
would be required to stand up in front of the rest of the class
(of 80 peers) and justify their response. For the no account-
ability condition, there were no such instructions. In the event,
participants were not required publicly to justify their responses.
Participants were fully debriefed at the end of the session.
The attribution of conspiracy question was the same and asked
three times. First, before reading evidence and participants read
any accountability instructions, second, immediately after read-
ing the evidence and third, after 2 h. A 2-h delay was chosen for
both conceptual and practical reasons. From a practical perspec-
tive, this was the longest period participants could reasonably be
asked to remain without discussing their ratings with other par-
ticipants. From a conceptual perspective, 2 h is widely considered
to be adequate time to observe changes in judgment, attitudes,
and reasoning, whilst constituting a meaningful separation time
between testing sessions.
Each time, as in study 1, participants were asked to place a
cross on a 5 cm scale indicating how likely they felt it was that
“. . . a conspiracy caused the plane crash.” A score was calcu-
lated by measuring the distance in millimeters along the line. The
higher score (50) indicated that participants thought a conspiracy
explanation unlikely. A lower score, that they found a conspiracy
attribution very likely. During the 2 intervening hours between
the penultimate and final time the question was asked, partici-
pants were involved in a class and were not able to discuss the
tasks with one another.
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Reliability of measures
Reliability analysis conducted on the BICT scale indicated good
reliability (N = 86, alpha= 0.61).
RESULTS
An initial related t-test found no difference between individuals
with high and low levels of belief and the attribution of a conspir-
acy to explain a novel event at time 1 (t1 only), t(85) = 0.65, p =
0.27. Subsequently, a 2× 2× 2 (BICT × evidence condition ×
NFCC condition) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on
the attribution score at time t1, t2, and t3.
In terms of within-subjects measures, there was a main effect
of BICT [F(1, 76) = 8.62, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.10]. Post-hoc
simple effects tests found a significant difference only at t3, t(82) =
2.52, p < 0.05, where those with high levels of belief in real world
conspiracy theories rated a conspiracy explanation more likely
for the fictitious event than those with low levels of belief in real
world conspiracy theories. Related t-tests revealed significant dif-
ferences between t1 and both t2 and t3 for those with low levels
of belief in conspiracies: t1 vs. t2, t(32) = 2.19, p < 0.05; t1 vs.
t3, t(32) = 2.75, p < 0.01). There were no significant differences
for a similar comparison between attribution scores at different
times for those with high BICT. Table 2 shows mean ratings for
the likelihood that a conspiracy theory explains the event best by
BICT.
There was also a strong effect of evidence condition on
the repeated measure, F(1, 76) = 19.87, p < 0.001, partial η2 =
0.21. There was a significant difference between evidence con-
ditions at both t2, t(84) = 9.30, p < 0.001, and t3, t(82) = 4.63,
p < 0.001. Related t-tests found significance for comparisons
across all times for those reading pro-conspiracy evidence: t1
vs. t2, t(41) = 8.04, p < 0.001; t2 vs. t3, t(39) = 3.05, p < 0.001;
t1 vs. t3, t(39) = 4.31, p < 0.001. Similarly, all comparisons for
those reading anti-conspiracy evidence were significant: t1 vs.
t2, t(43) = 7.91, p < 0.001; t2 vs. t3, t(43) = 3.48, p < 0.001; t1
vs. t3, t(43) = −3.52, p < 0.001. Table 3 shows mean ratings for
the likelihood that a conspiracy theory explains the event best by
evidence condition.
There were two effects between subjects. Firstly, as might be
expected from inspecting the means in Table 3, there was a main
effect of evidence type, F(1, 76) = 35.24, p < 0.001, partial η2 =
0.32. As was anticipated, those reading pro-conspiracy evidence
Table 2 | Mean attribution ratings (standard deviations in
parentheses) for the likelihood that a conspiracy theory explains the
event best by beliefs in conspiracy theories.
Attribution of likelihood of a
conspiracy to explain fictitious event
(0 = very likely, 50 = very unlikely)
Beliefs in
conspiracy theories
T1 T2 T3
High (N = 53) 22.23 (8.72) 21.32 (13.17) 20.25 (9.88)
Low (N = 33) 20.12 (8.81) 25.30 (13.06) 25.91 (9.88)
were more inclined, across the task, to consider a conspiracy likely
than those reading anti-conspiracy evidence across the task.
Secondly, there was a weak but significant interaction between
BICT, the attribution of conspiracy theories to a novel event (at
t2), and NFCC condition, F(1, 76) = 6.34, p < 0.05, partial η2 =
0.02. Figure 1 shows the interaction. Those with normal NFCC
(that is, in the low accountability condition) tended to make attri-
butions, after reading the evidence, that were more concordant
with their levels of belief in real world conspiracy theories: those
with high levels of belief rated a conspiracy explanation more
likely than those with low levels of belief. However, individuals
with high and low levels of BICT made broadly similar attribu-
tions of the likelihood of a conspiracy when NFCC was lowered
(high accountability condition).
Finally, three separate 2× 2× 2 (evidence × NFCC × BICT)
ANOVAs were conducted on the attribution scores at each sepa-
rate time interval (t1, t2, and t3). These revealed significant effects
of evidence condition at t2, F(1, 76) = 94.52, p < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.55. and t3, F(1, 76) = 23.76, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.24,
but not at t1. In both cases, the evidence type affected the
attribution score; those reading pro-conspiracy evidence rated
Table 3 | Mean attribution ratings for the likelihood that a conspiracy
theory explains the event best by beliefs in conspiracy theories and
evidence condition.
Attribution of likelihood of a
conspiracy to explain fictitious event
(0 = very likely, 50 = very unlikely)
Evidence condition T1 T2 T3
Pro-conspiracy
(N = 42)
21.86 (7.84) 13.29 (7.95) 17.55 (6.97)
Anti-conspiracy
(N = 44)
21.00 (9.65) 31.98 (10.45) 26.95 (10.99)
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FIGURE 1 | Mean likelihood attribution score at time t2 (after reading
evidence) by NFCC and beliefs in conspiracy theories.
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a conspiracy as a more likely explanation, those reading anti-
conspiracy evidence rated it as less likely. There was also a main
effect of BICT at t3 only, F(1, 76) = 5.17, p < 0.05, partial η2 =
0.06. There were also significant NFCC× BICT interactions at t2,
F(1, 76) = 7.20, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.09, and at t3, F(1, 76) =
4.28, p < 0.05, partial η2 = 0.05, but not at t1. Both of these
interactions mirrored that from the between-subjects interac-
tions from the repeated measures MANOVA (see again Figure 1):
lowered NFCC appeared to mollify the impact of prior BICT.
However, we found no relationship between NFCC and evi-
dence condition in terms of the attribution measure, F(1, 76) =
1.48, p = 0.76.
DISCUSSION
At baseline, before reading evidence or information relating to
high or no accountability (NFCC) conditions, levels of NFCC
and evidence condition did not relate to the initial attribution
of a conspiracy theory to explain the fictitious event. However,
again as predicted, after reading evidence there were signifi-
cant and strong effects associated with evidence type: specifically,
participants who read evidence that supported a conspiracy the-
ory rated a conspiracy explanation as more likely. Those who
had read evidence that undermined a conspiracy theory account
rated a conspiracy explanation less likely. These effects are con-
sistent with the observation that with ambiguity mere exposure
leads to influence (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993), and in part echo
Newheiser et al. (2011) experimental demonstration that expo-
sure to counter-conspiracy evidence can result in lowered belief
in the conspiracy.
A further prediction was that there would be an interaction
between level of NFCC and evidence type and in particular that
lower levels of NFCC would be associated with greater influ-
ence of evidence type. This relationship was predicted because
lowering NFCC is known to induce more systematic processing
of information and, given that the evidence presented to par-
ticipants was either clearly supporting or clearly undermining a
conspiracy theory, this more systematic processing should lead to
more dramatic influence when rating the likelihood of a conspir-
acy theory to explain the fictitious event. However, this prediction
was not supported. Indeed, a significant interaction suggests a
more complex pattern of relations involving NFCC, evidence and
levels of belief in real world conspiracy theories.
Our analysis also indicated a difference between those with
high and low levels of belief in conspiracy theories in terms of
their ratings of likelihood after reading evidence of either sort and
after a 2 h delay. Additional post-hoc tests showed this effect to
be attributable to changes in the low beliefs group after reading
evidence.
One explanation is that individuals with low levels of belief
in conspiracy theories were more responsive to anti-conspiracy
evidence and thus evaluated this evidence more favorably than
pro-conspiracy evidence. However, it remains unclear why those
with high levels of belief in conspiracy theories did not show a
similar bias (however, although not significant, there was a trend
in this direction). A further explanation fits with other findings
(Leman, 2007; Leman and Cinnirella, 2007) which found that
individuals with low levels of belief may be more trusting of the
veracity of reported facts than those with high levels of belief in
conspiracy theories (in the absence of further evidence the infer-
ence or attribution of conspiracy itself remained unaffected by
levels of belief in conspiracy theories). If this is the case, those with
low levels of belief in conspiracy theories may simply be more eas-
ily influenced by evidence per se and this, combined with biases
in evaluating evidence, leads to the significant effects in the low
beliefs group seen in the present study.
Effects of evidence condition were very strong, and were cer-
tainly much stronger than any effects of NFCC or BICT. However,
on the face of it these evidence effects were relatively short-lived,
and although they were still present, tended to diminish after
a 2-h interval when ratings were taken again on the likelihood
(attribution) measure. This contrasts, as we have seen, with what
appears to be a less immediate but more enduring influence of
BICT on ratings.
Finally, an interaction between NFCC and BICT points to a
complex set of relationships between the variables in terms of the
attribution of likelihood of a conspiracy to explain a fictitious
event. When NFCC was lowered there was very little difference
between likelihood ratings from participants with high and low
levels of belief in conspiracy theories. However, for participants
not in the high accountability condition (normal NFCC) indi-
viduals with high BICT tended to rate a conspiracy more likely,
whereas those with low beliefs tended to rate a conspiracy less
likely after reading the evidence. Once again, this interaction
holds true only after reading evidence but is not affected by the
type of evidence read. And again, this suggests that individu-
als’ BICT may incline them to process or evaluate evidence in a
manner that is consistent with their existing BICT.
Importantly though, the effects of BICT are nullified by low-
ering NFCC. With lower NFCC individuals are more motivated
to both attend to and scrutinize in more detail the evidence
(Klein and Webster, 2002). Hence we see rather more cautious
ratings of likelihood in the low NFCC group, reflecting that both
pro- and anti-conspiracy evidence is examined in more detail
than in the normal NFCC group. This finding is consistent with
research in the schema literature, which indicates that the goal of
accuracy (which may well have been activated in the low NFCC
manipulation) makes people remember and process more care-
fully schema-relevant information, and even schema-inconsistent
information (see Fiske and Taylor, 1991 for an overview).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our two studies examined the relationship between BICT, NFCC,
and the ways in which evidence is evaluated in respect of a fic-
titious event that may (or may not) have been attributable to a
conspiracy. Consistent with previous work (e.g., Abalakina-Paap
et al., 1999; Leman, 2007; Swami, 2012), our first study found
that an individual’s sense of alienation correlated with their lev-
els of belief in conspiracy theories. Also consistent with previous
evidence (Goertzel, 1994) was a correlation between low levels of
interpersonal trust and BICT.
Taken together the present findings extend our understand-
ing of social, personality and cognitive factors associated with
BICT. In this regard study 2 identified a complex relationship
between existing levels of belief in conspiracy theories, NFCC
and the evaluation of evidence. Specifically, existing BICT do
not appear immediately to affect an individual’s attribution of a
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conspiracy theory to explain a novel (fictitious) event. But, over
time individuals display a tendency to assimilate new events in a
manner that is consistent with existing beliefs. This connects with
(Wood et al., 2012) research showing that individuals have broad
general beliefs—monological belief systems—in conspiracy that
can make them endorse new conspiracy theories. It also connects
with clinical research (e.g., Mackay et al., 2006, 2007) indicating
that certain delusional beliefs may be connected with NFCC in
sometimes complex ways.
However, the present results appear to sit uneasily with other
research (e.g., Swami et al., 2011) which found that beliefs in real
world conspiracy theories were correlated with the likelihood of
attributing a theory to a ficitious, novel event. As we suggested,
it may be that specific types of event inspire different types of
reaction and more research is certainly needed to articulate the
relationship between events and conspiracy theories. The reason
for the mismatch between research findings here may, therefore,
connect back to earlier research (Leman and Cinnirella, 2007)
which identified features of an event as a significant compo-
nent in creating conspiracy theories. Big, sudden, or tragic events
may, initially, lead more people to adopt a conspiracy explanation
whereas conspiracies to do with public health and themotivations
of businessmenmay tap into existing beliefs about the worldmore
quickly for some than others.
Lowering NFCC (increasing accountability and hence giving
participants a greater motivation to scrutinize the evidence and
justify their rating) appeared to cancel out the influence of exist-
ing BICT. This finding is consistent with research on the effects
of accuracy motivations in schematic processing and on stereo-
typic processing, with all of these research areas demonstrating
that when accuracy becomes important to the actor, it can over-
come tendencies toward processing information in a heuristic
manner and encourage more systematic processing. This latter
finding also suggests that those who took a less systematic (more
heuristic) approach to evaluating any evidence were more likely
to end up with an account that was more consistent with their
previous beliefs.
While biases in the evaluation and assimilation of evidence
may be part of the story, the relationship between BICT and
evidence may be more complex still in real-world situations for
at least two reasons. Firstly, it may not be merely processing of
information but also the search for information (or evidence)
that is subject to biases (Lord et al., 1979; Klayman and Ha, 1987;
McHoskey, 1995). In this respect, a hard-nosed conspiracy the-
orist may seek out (or regard as legitimate) only the evidence
that conforms to a particular view. In a similar vein, a hard-nosed
anti-conspiracy theorist may not only reject evidence that points
toward a conspiracy theory account but also spendmore time and
devote more psychological resources to seeking out evidence that
undermines a conspiracy account.
Secondly, the present study explored attributions relating to
the likelihood of a conspiracy theory to explain a novel, fictitious
event. Whilst such an approach makes experimental study possi-
ble and reduces the possibility of un-measured variables creating
noise in the data, it removes context from the decision-making
process. This final point is most clearly illustrated by findings
from the first study that identified alienation and low levels of
interpersonal trust as correlating with BICT. Whilst the negative
correlation between interpersonal trust and BICT points toward a
role for personality factors (see again Goertzel, 1994), the consis-
tent finding across these and other studies of a strong relationship
between feelings of alienation and BICT suggests, again, that
broader social processes are also at play (e.g., Crocker et al.,
1999). Indeed, the link between conspiracy theories and feelings
of alienation suggests intriguing parallels with inter-group phe-
nomena and aspects of individuals’ social identities. For example,
defensive attributions and complex intergroup processes may lie
behind the adoption by some Muslims of 9/11 conspiracy the-
ories. In this respect adoption and endorsement of conspiracy
theories could ultimately become a mechanism for expressing
social identity under circumstances where adoption of particular
conspiracies is deemed to be normative for a group. Thus, poten-
tially fertile ground for future research would be to investigate
the degree to which levels of interpersonal trust and aspects of
an individual’s social identity may predispose individuals to high
levels of belief in conspiracy theories. Any such research would
benefit from using real-world conspiracy theories that resonate
with the social identities of participants. In addition, there may
be societal level forces which are acting to make conspiracy theo-
ries more popular amongst certain populations, and these need to
be considered an important backdrop to the socio-psychological
processes involved in conspiracy beliefs (Aupers, 2012).
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APPENDIX 1
BELIEFS IN CONSPIRACY THEORIES (BICT)
There was no conspiracy involved in the assassination of John. F.
Kennedy. (-)
The European Union is trying to take control of the United
Kingdom.
Princess Diana’s death was an accident. (-)
Governments are suppressing evidence of the existence of
aliens.
The AIDS virus was created in a laboratory.
The attack on the Twin Towers was not a terrorist action but a
governmental conspiracy.
The American moon landings were faked.
A government exercise was behind the suicide at Jones Town.
NOTES:
1. Participants are asked to rate their beliefs in a 5-point scale
(1, strongly disagree; 2, disagree; 3, don’t know; 4, agree;
5, strongly agree)
2. (-) items are reverse scored
3. Total score (including reverse items) indicates levels of belief
in conspiracy theories
APPENDIX 2
ATTRIBUTION OF A CONSPIRACY THEORY TO A NOVEL (FICTITIOUS)
EVENT
Vignette
NEWS REPORT: PLANE CRASH KILLS LEADING POLITICAL FIGURE
An investigation is under way after a 20-seater plane, carrying
Sir——, crashed killing all of five people on board. The acci-
dent happened at around 1pm yesterday although emergency
services arrived at the scene of the crash only after at 4.25 pm. A
police spokesman said: “A full air accident investigation has been
launched and at this time we believe that the crash was caused
by mechanical failure.” He also stated that the plane was believed
to have taken off from the —- area, but refused to reveal the
intended destination of the plane. A senior duty officer with the
—–Ambulance Service said: “I was down there this afternoon and
it looked pretty bad. One eyewitness reported: everything seemed
fine but then there was a bang and it nose-dived.”
It is understood that, prior to the incident, Sir —– was under
24 h protection in light of the upcoming election and that all pos-
sible safe guards had been put in place to ensure his safety. A
source has also revealed that the journey was initially planned to
be by rail and plans were switched at the last minute due to safety
concerns. Political figures close to the former head of the oppo-
sition described the incident as shocking and devastating for the
party. Also killed were three security agents and Sir —–’s press
secretary.
APPENDIX 3
EVIDENCE FOR (PRO-CONSPIRACY) AND AGAINST
(ANTI-CONSPIRACY) CONSPIRACY THEORY ACCOUNT FOR THE
FICTITIOUS EVENT
Pro-conspiracy:
The accident investigation report could not identify a cause for
the crash.
Some interested parties have expressed concern that the crash
may not have been an accident.
The plane had been given a full engineering check only the day
before the crash, and was judged to be in excellent working order.
The emergency services arrived late because they had received
contradictory evidence from anonymous witnesses concerning
the location of the plane.
The “safety concerns,” which had necessitated the change in
travel plans, related to intelligence suggesting that an assassina-
tion attempt on Sir—– was imminent.
Anti-conspiracy:
The accident investigation report cited mechanical failure as
the cause of the crash.
All interested parties were satisfied that the crash had been an
accident.
Three months prior to the crash an identical fault had been
detected on another plane of the same model, type and make.
The late arrival of the emergency services had been due to the
restricted information concerning the location of the plane.
The security threat, which had necessitated the change in travel
plans, was deemed to be unfounded.
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